Tag Archives: Daubert Standard

Florida Supreme Court set to Hear Arguments in Battle over Expert Witness Qualifications

A legal fight over expert witness qualifications in Florida is going to the state Supreme Court for a final decision. Since 2013, businesses, legislators, and attorneys have engaged in a dispute over what the appropriate legal standard for expert witness qualification should be, and the Florida Supreme Court has finally agreed to rule on the issue and hear arguments in early September.

Florida Legislature Pushes for Daubert Expert Witness Standard

In 2013 the Florida legislature passed a bill which elevated the standard used to evaluate expert witness qualifications from the Frye test to the Daubert test. Unlike the Frye test, which allows an expert to testify if his experience and content of his testimony are accepted by his professional field, the Daubert test for expert witnesses requires judges to thoroughly evaluate the testimony to make sure it is relevant to the trial and valid. Under the Daubert standard, trial judges must determine if the testimony is based on adequate facts or data, has been generated from reliable research principles and methods, and is the result of a proper application of the research principles and methods used. While judges still look to accepted practices of the expert’s professional field for guidance, the Daubert standard requires more careful evaluation of testimony before it is admissible.

The stricter Daubert test is used by the Federal judiciary and a majority of the states, but Florida has held onto the lessor Frye test, largely with the support of plaintiff attorneys and judges who prefer an expert witness standard which favors admissibility. In 2013, however, members of the business community and a coalition of defense attorneys were able to convince the Florida legislature that the Frye test exposes trials to “junk science” and unqualified expert witnesses because it is not restrictive enough, and as a result the lawmakers legislatively imposed the Daubert standard on all judicial proceedings in the state.

The move has not come without controversy, and over the last 3 years since it passed judges and plaintiffs’ attorneys have consistently rejected its implementation, culminating earlier this year in a recommendation from the Florida Bar Board of Governors that the state Supreme Court dismiss the law and retain the Frye standard for admissibility of expert witness testimony.

Florida Bar Association Calls for Frye Expert Witness Standard

Opponents of the Daubert standard argue that it unfairly restricts the expert witnesses that plaintiffs are allowed to call by placing unnecessary restrictions on admissibility. Plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that increased standards on expert witness admissibility only serves to drive up the cost of litigation which will make filing and pursuing lawsuits prohibitively expensive for some clients. Frye test proponents argue that a simpler test for expert witness qualification provides greater access to the legal system by not eliminating potential claims based on the financial resources of litigants.

Beyond ideological opposition to the Daubert standard, opponents of the 2013 Florida law argue the legislature does not have the authority to establish judicial rules of evidence. In a report released in March of this year, the Florida Bar Board of Governors formally recommended that the judiciary reject the 2013 law because it overstepped the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches of Florida government. According to opponents of the 2013 law, the legislature does not have the authority to tell the judiciary what the required standard for expert witness admissibility is, and the Supreme Court should therefore dismiss the law and continue with the traditional Frye test which Florida courts have used for years.

Florida Expert Witness Challenged Headed to State Supreme Court

Earlier this month, the Florida Supreme Court agreed to settle the debate about the state’s expert witness admissibility standard by issuing a final legal ruling. Supporters of the 2013 legislation argue that the people of Florida, through their elected representatives, have expressed the desire to increase the standard for expert witness testimony in order to keep “junk science” and frivolous experts away from litigation. Opponents of the law maintain that the legislative body does not have the authority to determine expert witness admissibility standards.

The case has gained significant attention across the state with several businesses and lawyers filing comments with the Florida Supreme Court in an effort to tilt the scales. The central question in the dispute – whether the legislature has authority to define rules of evidence – is an interesting legal battle between state judicial and legislative branches which will impact the way in which expert witnesses can be used in Florida.

Missouri Passes Daubert Bill, Governor May Veto

States legislatures, bar associations, and courts are continuing to debate the appropriate standard for the admission of expert testimony. As an attempt to defeat the Florida legislature’s adoption of the Daubert standard heats up, the Missouri legislature has sent Governor Jay Nixon a bill that would replace the state’s current rule of expert testimony admissibility with a Daubert standard.

The Daubert standard

Having been adopted by the federal government and a majority of states, the Daubert standard is now familiar to lawyers and to expert witnesses. Judges applying Daubert generally see their role as that of a “gatekeeper.” Before allowing a jury to hear expert testimony, the judge must be satisfied that the expert’s testimony is both relevant and reliable.

Expert testimony is relevant under Daubert if it would help the jury decide the case and if:

the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

To decide whether scientific principles and methods are reliable, Daubert requires the judge to consider whether the method that the expert used to form a scientific opinion:

can be and has been tested;
has been subjected to peer review and publication;
is not associated with an unacceptable error rate;
is controlled by standards; and
has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community.

More ambiguous standards govern the evaluation of nonscientific expert testimony, which by its nature does depend upon the application of the scientific method.

The Missouri Bill

The bill that passed the Missouri House would adopt the Daubert standard in most trials. The current Missouri rule of expert evidence provides that an expert may testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion would help the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) “understand the evidence” or “determine a fact in issue,” provided the expert is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” To form an opinion, the expert may rely on any “reasonably reliable” facts that are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.”

Like the Daubert standard, the current Missouri rule does not require experts to form opinions by using a methodology that has gained widespread acceptance. The Missouri rule therefore differs from the traditional Frye standard of admissibility. “Widespread acceptance” is a factor the court can consider under Daubert, but no single factor is controlling.

At the same time, the Missouri rule differs from Daubert, which does not require experts to rely on the kind of facts that would ordinarily be relied upon by other experts in the same field. In that sense, Missouri’s current rule might be more restrictive than the Daubert standard. It is therefore unclear whether the change proposed by the bill would benefit plaintiffs or defendants.

As a general rule, lawyers who represent businesses and insurance companies like Daubert because they believe it gives them an opportunity to prevent plaintiffs’ experts from testifying when their opinions are not based on customary or orthodox methodologies. Plaintiff’s lawyers and consumer advocates tend to view Daubert as improperly substituting the judge’s opinion for the jury’s in the assessment of a methodology’s reliability.

Daubert’s Unclear Impact

In reality, the distinction between the Daubert standard, the Frye standard, and the current Missouri standard is only important at the fringes, since most scientific experts based their opinions on uncontroversial methodologies, even when their opinions conflict. One study suggests that the difference between standards of expert opinion admissibility does not typically affect the outcome of a case. The Missouri Bar’s Expert Witness Legislation Working Group concluded that there is no objective proof that the Frye standard, the Daubert standard, or the current Missouri standard is more likely to increase the fairness of a trial, although the Daubert standard tends to impose greater burdens on the judicial system by making more work for judges.

The Missouri bill would apply the Daubert standard to civil cases other than those arising in probate court, juvenile court, or family court. If the true purpose of the bill is to increase the reliability of evidence, it seems odd that the Missouri legislature would think that juvenile and family cases should turn on less reliable expert evidence.

The bill’s fate is now in the hands of Governor Nixon. The bill was supported by business lobbyists but opposed by the state’s Circuit Judges Association and a bipartisan group of legislators. The Missouri Times reports that the governor is expected to veto the bill.

Conviction Reversed Because Defense Expert Not Allowed to Testify

In a decision released on January 20, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court decided that a trial judge erred by refusing to allow a criminal defendant to call an expert in experimental design as a defense witness in a murder trial. That ruling allowed the testimony of the state’s firearms expert to go unchallenged.

The Evidence Against Romero

A man in Tucson died from two gunshot wounds in 2000. There were no witnesses to the shooting. Witnesses did see men leaving the scene in a pickup truck after hearing gunshots, but they could not agree upon the number of men or the make of the truck. Spent .40-caliber shell casings were found at the scene.

A month later, the police stopped Joseph Javier Romero for reasons that were unrelated to the shooting. They found a .40-caliber magazine in his possession. They also discovered a .40-caliber Glock handgun with a missing magazine along the route that Romero had traveled. The police drew the inference that Romero had jettisoned the gun, although they did not see that happen.

Seven years later, a cold case unit inspected a cellphone that was found next to the victim’s body. The phone’s owner told the police that “Joe,” his drug dealer, had borrowed his pickup truck in 2000. A firearms examiner conducted a ballistics test and concluded that the shells found at the scene had been fired from the Glock that the police associated with Romero. Romero was charged with first degree murder. A hung jury resulted in a second trial.

Rulings on Expert Testimony

Before Romero’s second trial started, the defense moved to exclude the testimony of the State’s firearms expert. The State, in turn, moved to exclude the testimony of Romero’s expert. The motions were based on Arizona’s version of the Daubert rule, which requires expert testimony to be based on a reliable methodology.

The trial court reviewed the proposed testimony of both experts. Romero’s expert did not address whether the State’s expert correctly analyzed the markings on the shell casings. Rather, he testified that no analysis of such markings is capable of yielding a reliable result, given the limitations of the experimental methods used by firearms examiners.

The trial court determined that the State’s expert based his conclusion on a reliable methodology and therefore permitted the expert to testify. The court excluded the testimony of the defense expert after concluding that the expert was not qualified to testify as a firearms expert and that submitting his testimony to the jury would invite the jury to second-guess the judge’s pretrial finding that the methodology used by the State’s expert was reliable.

Romero’s Retrial and Appeal

During Romero’s second trial, the State’s expert testified that the marks made on casings found at the scene of the shooting “matched very well” marks made by the gun that the police associated with Romero. The jury acquitted Romero of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder.

On appeal, Romero argued that his right to present a defense was violated by the judge’s exclusion of his expert’s testimony. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed.

The trial court and a lower appellate court decided that the defense expert was not qualified to testify, despite his review of applicable scientific literature, because he had never testified as a firearms expert before, had never conducted his own research on firearms identification, and had never tried to identify firearms based on the toolmarks found on expended shells. The state supreme court rejected that argument, noting that the witness’ expertise was not in firearms identification but in experimental design.

The court noted that the defense was not required to offer testimony from the same kind of expert that the state used. Rather, it was entitled to offer expert evidence that would help the jury decide the case. The defense expert would have helped the jury understand that the scientific methodology used by firearms experts differs in significant ways from methodologies that are routinely adopted by other scientists. Unlike other scientists, firearms experts do not follow standardized protocols that permit independent verification by other examiners. In addition, firearms identification relies on subjective assessments rather than an objective assessment based on a comparison of test subjects to control subjects.

The defense expert would have testified that the methodology used by firearms experts falls short of the scientific standards for experimental design, and that those flawed design standards undercut the reliability of the results the experts reach. That testimony would have helped the jury evaluate the evidence offered by the State’s firearms expert. The testimony was therefore admissible under Daubert’s “helpfulness” standard.

The defense expert had a Ph.D. in experimental psychology from Stanford and taught experimental design at Yale and other universities. He makes a profession of analyzing scientific methods. His careful study of the experimental methods used by firearms experts qualified him to render expert opinions about the validity of those methods.

Since the expert was qualified to give opinions that would have assisted the jury in evaluating the state’s evidence, the supreme court concluded that he should have been allowed to testify. The trial judge misunderstood his role when he ruled that the defense expert should not be allowed to undermine his determination that the State’s expert’s methodology was reliable. The judge’s assessment permits the jury to hear an expert’s testimony, but it does not require the jury to believe the expert. Evaluating expert testimony, once it has been admitted into evidence, is the function of the jury, not the judge.

Missouri Debates Adoption of Daubert Standard

Missouri is the latest state to consider jumping on the Daubert bandwagon. The Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert opinion testimony requires judges to exclude opinions that are not based on reliable methodology. Proponents of the Daubert standard argue that it protects against jury verdicts based on “junk science.” The difficulty of deciding whether opinions are based on “junk science” is summed up in the title of a scholarly article that examines the issue: “Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science.”

The Daubert standard governs expert testimony in federal court. About 35 states have adopted some form of the Daubert standard, although (as ExpertPages recently reported) the Florida bar is asking its state supreme court to reject the Florida legislature’s adoption of Daubert. Most of the remaining states adhere to the Frye standard, which admits expert testimony if it is based on scientific methods or findings that have gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.

Missouri follows neither Daubert nor Frye. The Missouri test of admissibility, adopted by the state legislature in 1989, requires “the facts and data upon which the expert relies to be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field” provided that the testimony is “otherwise reasonably reliable.”. As is true in federal court, the threshold question in Missouri is whether expert testimony would assist the jury in finding a fact or understanding the evidence.

Critics Attack Missouri Standard of Admissibility

Testifying in support of a bill that would adopt the Daubert standard of admissibility in Missouri, Brian Bunten, the general counsel for the Missouri Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told a legislative committee that “Missouri state judges have their hands tied by an outdated rule for admitting expert testimony—a rule that dates back to 1923 and has been abandoned by the vast majority of states in one form or another.” Bunten’s reference to the Frye standard was misguided, however, since the Missouri legislature rejected Frye when it adopted the current standard in 1989.

It is nevertheless accurate that the current Missouri standard is less restrictive than Daubert. Bunten testified that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ranked Missouri’s judicial system 42nd out of 50 and said that “the American Tort Reform Association ranked Missouri’s judicial system the fourth worst judicial hellhole in the United States, explicitly citing the lack of Daubert standard in our courtrooms as the reason for the poor rating.”

“Judicial hellhole” is a buzzword that is typically used to describe states in which consumers and injury victims have a better-than-average chance of winning compensation from juries. Notably, the Chamber of Commerce and the American Tort Reform Association both represent the business community, which has an interest in shielding businesses from jury verdicts. Advocates for injury victims and consumers are likely to prefer Missouri’s current standard.

Does the Standard Matter?

Since “junk science” is not generally accepted by any scientific community, expert opinions based on unreliable methodologies should be inadmissible under either Frye or Daubert. It is not clear that the standard adopted by a state actually has a real-world impact on trial outcomes. It is also unclear that judges, who typically lack a scientific background, are more capable than juries of evaluating the reliability of methodologies employed by forensic scientists and other experts.

A widely cited study by law professors Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon suggests that whether a state follows the Daubert or Frye standard makes little difference, at least in tort cases. If there was ever a serious problem of expert witnesses relying on “junk science,” as proponents of the Daubert standard claim, judicial awareness of that problem has increased, regardless of the standard the state applies. As judges have developed a stronger understanding of what makes an expert opinion reliable, they have become less inclined to allow juries to consider unreliable opinions.

In addition, the fact that jurors are allowed to consider an expert opinion does not mean that jurors will accept it. The fear that juries are swayed by junk science finds little support in empirical studies. Juries are usually capable of distinguishing treasure from junk.

In some instances, the Daubert standard authorizes the admission of expert testimony that the Frye standard would disallow. Opinions that are derived from reliable methodology are admissible under Daubert even if they have not gained general acceptance in the scientific community. To the extent that Daubert liberalizes the admissibility of expert opinions, it may not be the shield that some members of the business community believe it to be.

As Robert Underwood wrote, “nothing fosters belief like self interest.” That can be true of experts who tailor opinions to favor the party who pays for those opinions. It can also be true of lawyers who argue for standards of admissibility that they regard as improving their chances of winning cases. In the end, expert testimony plays a vital role in the justice system and will continue to do so regardless of the standards of admissibility that states choose to adopt.

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